Research · Macro-financial strategy

Macro-structure, DMOs and monetary regimes

With Enrico Pulieri · In preparation

Central bank independence is half the story. Sovereign debt is managed by a separate institution with its own claim to independence, and the two postures interact. This project reads monetary policy and debt management as one architecture rather than two literatures, and situates both inside the systemic structure of financialised capitalism.

Stylised diagram of the EMU macro-structure: debt management office, banks, central counterparty, infrastructure and national central bank linked by government securities, collateral, repos and liquidity.
Stylised representation of the EMU macro-structure.Full size

Macro-structure

A conceptualisation of the systemic relations, architectures and tendencies running through financialised capitalism.

Debt management operations

The political economy of debt management: whether DMO "independence" holds, and where debt management offices work with the central bank or against it.

Monetary regime

Central-bank posture is not readable from policy decisions alone. Placing those decisions inside the financial architecture and the instruments available is what makes the regime visible.

Related publications

  • Giordano, M. and Pulieri, E. (forthcoming). Debt Management (in-)Dependence: The missing side of Central Banks and the Legacy of CBI.
  • Giordano, M. and Goghie, A. (2023). From Policy to Regime: the changing posture of the ECB between liquidity and collateral through the lens of Monetary Regime. SocArXiv Working Paper. DOI
  • Lapavitsas, C. and Giordano, M. (2026). ECB monetary policy in a quandary. European Law Open. DOI